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IN TH~ SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNETTE U. SWAN,. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and 
DR. DENNIS D. THOEN, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 14823 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice case brought by 
by the plaintiff JEANNETTE U. SWAN against defendants 
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB, a specialist in the field of 
orthopedic surgery, and DR. DENNIS D. THOEN, a 
specialist in the field of neurology, for injuries 
in the form of permanent partial. paraplegia, which 
she allegedly suffered as a result of certain 
diagnostic and surgical procedures improperly per-
formed upon her spine and spinal canal by the said 
defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was brought, inter alia, on theories 
of negligence and lack of inform~d consent, and was 
tried before a jury. At trial the court refused to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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allow plaintiff's expert witness to testify concern-
ing the standard of medical care which governed 
defendant's conduct. Having so ruled, the court, 
at the close of plaintiff's evidence, granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss as to the negligence 
theory for failure to establish a prima facie case. 
The case went to the jury with instructions on the 
theory of lack of informed consent only, and the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants, 
no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision in 
the lower court and the grant of a new trial on 
grounds that the trial judge erred in stating and 
applying the law in Utah with respect to (1) the 
standard of care required of doctors who are alleged 
to have committed medical malpractice, and (2) the 
qualifications required of an expert witness in 
order that he be permitted to testify as to the said 
standard of care. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 12, 1972, the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Jeannette U. Swan, age 68, was admitted by her pri-
vate physician to the St. Mark's Hospital in Salt 
. . . 1 t · of persistent Lake City for diagnosis and eva ua ion 
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pains that she had been experiencing in her lower 
back and right leg. Transcript, day 1 at 33-34. At 
the time of her admission, Mrs. Swan was ambulatory 
and, though she found it painful at times to do so, 
was able to walk and move about the hospital with 
some facility. Tr. day 4 at 72. 
The first days of her hospitalization consisted 
of a variety of tests and examinations. On Septem-
ber 13th, her motor and nerve responses were found 
to be essentially normal (Tr. day 2 at 5) but other 
tests led her doctors to believe that she might have 
a high degree of block in her spinal canal. Tr. day 
2 at 13; 3 at 21. On the fifth day of her hospital 
stay, September 16, 1972, a myelogram was performed 
upon Mrs. Swan by the defendant Dr. Dennis D. Thoen, 
a neurologist. Tr. day 3 at 18. In this procedure, 
a quantity of spinal fluid was removed from the 
terminal portion of the spinal canal and replaced by 
injection of 10 cc of a radiographic contrast medium 
called pantopaque. Tr. day 3 at 20, 26-27. Mrs. 
Swan was then titled into various positions so that 
the flow of pantopaque could be observed under flouro-
scopy and indicate the presence or absence of defects, 
obstructions or other abnormalities in the area of 
the spinal canal. Tr. day 2 at 15; 3 at 18, 48, 69. 
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In the course of performing the myelogram, Dr. 
Thoen did not record the opening or closing spinal 
fluid pressures. Tr. day 3 at 24, 30. Neither did 
he record the quantity of spinal fluid removed prior 
to the injection of the pantopaque radiographic dye. 
Tr. day 3 at 27. At the conclusion of the myelograrn, 
Dr. Theon did not remove the pantopaque. Tr. day 
3 at 32. During the actual myelographic procedure, 
Mrs. Swan complained of very severe pain. Tr. day 4 
at 71. Following the myelogram, the intense pain 
persisted and was accompanied by general weakness in 
her legs. Tr. day 3 at 41. Although Dr. Thoen stated 
that he conducted a neurological examination upon 
Mrs. Swan in an attempt to determine the cause of 
her pain and weakness, she was neither x-rayed nor 
flouroscoped in the ensuing days. Tr. day 3 at 42, 
48-49. 
Results of the myelogram showed defects consist-
ing of narrowing or blocks at the L-1, L-2 and L-3 
lumbar vertebral levels. Tr. day 2 at 15. Dr. Thoen 
recommended surgery to correct the defects. Tr. day 
3 at 46. 
On September 18, 1972, defendant Dr. Robert H. 
Lamb performed a lumbar 
upon Mrs. Swan's spine. 
decompression laminectomy 
Tr. day~2 at 21, 22, 29 . 
said procedure, performed in the face of changing 
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I 
i 
l 
l 
neurological signs (Tr. day 2 at 112) and without 
the benefit of a current neurological examination 
(Tr. day 3 at 46-47), involved the surgical removal 
of portions of bone in the lumbar area in an effort 
to cure the narrowing at the spinal canal. Tr. day 
2 at 97. None of the bone removed was ever sent 
to the pathology lab. Tr. day 2 at 41. In what was 
the seventh of eight separate operations performed 
by Dr. Lamb that same day (Tr. day 2 at 45), he 
operated from the L-2 level down to L-4, but did not 
operate at the site of the defect indicated at L-1; 
neither did he use a cather to determine whether 
the spinal canal was clear at L-1. Tr. day 2 at 32, 
112-113; Tr. day 2 at 15, 16. Mrs. Swan testified 
that prior to the operation Dr. Lamb assured her 
that she would be out of the hospital in about ten 
days. Tr. 4 at 73. She also testified that he told 
her she would be better if she had an operation. Tr. 
day 4 at 74. 
When Mrs. Swan awoke the morning following 
surgery, she could not move her legs. Tr. day 4 at 
75. An examination by Dr. Thoen on September 20, 
1972, revealed that she was not able to move anything 
below her knees. Tr. day 3 at 47. On October 9, 1972, 
Dr. Al Martin performed a decompression laminectomy 
at the L-1 level of Mrs. Swan's spine. Tr. day 2 
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at 25, 106. This second operation failed to restore 
any significant capacity in the use of her lower 
extremities and on November 7, 1972, Mrs. Swan was 
discharged to the Bonneville Nursing Home as a para-
plegic. Tr. day 1 at 35, 39, 44. 
At the time of the trial of this case, Mrs. 
Swan was medically found to be suffering from para-
plegia. In connection with that condition, she has 
lost control of her bowel and bladder function, 
experienced atrophy of her left lower extremity and 
paralysis of all nerve roots below the L-3, L-4 level, 
and has lost feeling in her right foot, left leg and 
about the saddle peritoneal areas. Tr. day 4 at 27, 
28. She must wear a leg brace and use a wheelchair 
or walker to get from place to place in her apartment. 
Tr. day 1 at 43. She is required to take large doses 
of narcotic medications for pain. Tr. day 1 at 44 · 
At the trial of her· case, the plaint~iff, Mrs. 
Swan, offered the expert testimony of a neurosurgeon 
from Los Angeles, Dr. Peter M. Rocovich, on the issue 
of the standard of care required of physicians and 
surgeons performing myelograms and lumbar decompression 
laminectomies on persons like plaintiff at the time 
when the said procedures were performed upon her. 
Included among Dr. Rocovich's credentials that were 
l 
-6-
for such testi•'"YJ presented to the court as foundation 
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were the following: 
The doctor received his M.D. degree from St. 
Louis University School of Medicine in 1942, after 
which he interned at Huntington Memorial Hospital 
in Pasadena, California. For three years, from 1943-
1946, he was a general surgeon in the U.S. Army in the 
European theatre. Following his military service he 
fulfilled his residency requirements in neurosurgery 
at White Memorial Hospital which was associated 
with the Loma Linda Medical College. In 1948-1949 
he served as instructor of resident neurological 
surgery at Albany Medical College in New York. In 
that assignment, he was charged with instructing and 
training in the fields of neurology and neurosurgery. 
In 1949, the doctor returned to California and started 
private practice where he has continued to the present. 
For 25 years Dr. Rocovich has headed a neurological 
and neurosurgical clinic at the Orthopedic Hospital 
of Los Angeles. The Orthopedic Hospital affiliates 
with the University of Southern California Medical 
School and is involved in teaching and training resi-
dent physicians from all 9ver the United States. Dr. 
Rocovich was also the head of the Department of 
Neurosurgery at the Queen of Angels Hospital in 
Los Angeles for 12 years and served for a time on 
the faculty school of nursing. During such time, 
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said hospital had a complete training program for 
interns and residents as well as a medical school 
affiliation. Dr. Rocovich is a member of numerous 
medical societies, both national and regional, 
including the American Medical College, Western 
States Federation of Neurological Sciences, Californ~ 
Medical Association, Southern California Neurosurgkal 
Society, and Los Angeles County Medical Association. 
Tr. day 3 at 100-105. 
In addition to the above mentioned credentials, 
Dr. Rocovich testified that, over the course of his 
professional career he personally had performed over 
a thousand lumbar decompression laminectomies and 
over a thousand myelograms of the types that were 
performed upon Mrs. Swan. Tr. day 3 at 109. Dr. 
Rocovich was asked whether he was acquainted with 
standards of skill and care for neurosurgeons 
practicing in any states outside of California. 
His affirmative response was followed by the 
following explanation: 
From my educaticn background, from_ the 
individual education background, from being 
a graduate of a graqe A medical school, from 
being trained in various parts of the co~ntry 
at different times, from being accepted into 
the Army and with other men, other doctors 
from all over the states of the union and 
all on the same equal level- in the Army, 
from my practice in--well, in the large 
communities where you have medical schools 
-8-
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and where you have hospitals, where 
you have training programs, and you have 
communications and you have books, 
you have publications, you have the 
competition of one area against the 
other. This establishes the practice 
throughout the whole country and it's 
on the same level. Tr. day 3 at 107. 
When Dr. Rocovich was asked if he had an opinion 
as to whether or not there was a different standard 
of care for various types of doctors who operate to 
enter the spinal canal objections by defendants 
were sustained for lack of proper foundation. Tr. 
day 3 at 109,110. Plaintiff offered to prove that 
the standard of care for all doctors entering the 
spinal canal area was the same. Tr. day 3 at 119. 
Plaintiff further offered to prove that myelograrn 
and decompression laminectomy procedures of the 
types to which she had been subjected were routinely 
performed by persons in defendants' fields and, as 
such, were standardized in much the same way as the 
treatment of a broken arm. Tr. day 3 at 120. 
After considering the issue of what standard 
of medical care to apply, the court rejected plaintiff's 
arguments for application of a similar community 
standard, (Tr. day 3 at 111), as well as a standard 
of the medical profession, (Tr. day 3 at 114), and 
ruled that Utah law required a doctor to exercise 
only that degree of skill and care required of the 
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average competent medical practitioner in defendan~' 
same locality, Tr. day 3 at 111; furthermore, that in ordE: 
to be qualified to testify on said standard of care in 
such a locality, a witness had to demonstrate "per-
sonal contact or experience within the State of 
Utah." Tr. day 3 at 118. See also Tr. day 4 at 6, 
7. The trial judge ruled that since Dr. Rocovich 
had not practiced in Utah he could not testify as 
to the standard of care required of a doctor 
practicing in Utah. 
Had Dr. Rocovich been permitted to, he would 
have testified that the conduct of both defendants 
violated" the standards of care for the performance 
of myelograms and lumbar decompression laminectomies 
in Salt Lake City and areas similar to Salt Lake City 
during the period of September, 1972, as follows: 
Dr. Thoen failed to perform and record a com-
plete neurological examination prior to the first 
surgery. He left the pantopaque in the spinal canal. 
He failed to repeat the myelogram before surgery 
despite the presence of partial paralysis. He 
failed to record neurological findings and changes 
which he claims to have observed. He failed to pro-
perly record findings with respect to the myelogram 
procedure. Tr. day 4 at 106-107~ 
Dr. Lamb operated without a complete and current 
-10-
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neurological examination in the face of changing 
neurological signs following the myelogram and prior 
to surgery. He failed to submit surgical specimens 
to the pathology lab for evaluation. He failed to 
decompress the lamina at L-1 during the surgery he 
performed. He failed to use a catheter to determine 
whether the spinal canal was clear at the L-1 level 
at the time of surgery. He traumatized the nerve 
roots at L-3, L-4 during surgery. Tr. day 4 at 106. 
Despite the court's preclusion of his opinion con-
cerning the standard of care, plaintiff's expert 
was deemed qualified to express an opinion with 
probable medical certainty as to what caused 
plaintiff's injuries. He stated that Mrs. Swan's 
paraplegia was due to trauma which occurred princi-
pally at the time of surgery. Tr. day 4 at 44. As 
described by Dr. Rocovich, the irritation to the nerve 
roots caused by non-removal of the pantopaque caused 
them to be inflamed or injured. Said injury was 
compounded when the nerve roots were traumatized 
upon surgical removal of the posterior arch, thus 
producing immediate paralysis. Tr. day 4 at 46-47. 
Plaintiff's evidence of causation, stripped of 
the benefit of her expert's testimony as to the 
standard of care, was deemed insufficient to survive 
defendant's motion to dismiss as to the negligence 
-11-
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count of her complaint. Tr. day 5 at 6. Thus, Mrs. Swan 
was prevented from reaching a jury with that portion 
of her claim. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT, A CALIFORNIA NEUROSURGEON, 
TO TESTIFY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED 
OF THE DEFENDANT DOCTORS. 
In order to maintain an action for medical rnal-
practice, a plaintiff-patient must prove that the 
defendant-physician's conduct failed to meet the 
particular standard of care and skill that the jur-
isdiction in question requires of all physicians and 
surgeons encJaged in the same type of practice as the 
defendant, and that said failure was the cause of 
the injury claimed to have been suffered. w. Prosser, 
Handbook of the Law of Torts 161-166 (4th ed. 1971). 
In order to establish the standard, since knowledge 
of such things is not possessed by laymen, the 
plaintiff must, generally speaking, produce testimony 
from a medical expert who can explain said standard 
as defined in that jurisdiction, and can also state 
whether any breach thereof caused the harm complained 
of. See Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 
(1957); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 130 P.2d 216 
(1943). 
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History shows that the courts of the United 
states have used four basic approaches in establishing 
the standard of care to be required of physicians 
and surgeons. They have variously required that 
such practitioners exercise the skill and care of 
physicians in good standing in (1) the defendant's 
same locality (strict localj ty rule); (2) the 
defendant's same general neighborhood (same general 
neighborhood rule); (3) localj ties similar to 
defendant's (similar locality rule); or (4) the 
medical profession (national standard rule). Annot., 
37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971); D. Louisell & H. Williams, 1 
Medical Malpractice, ~[8. 06 (197 3) . 
In ruling tbat Dr. Rocovich did not qualify to 
testify as to the standard of care required of the 
defendant physicians in this case, the trial judge 
stated that decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
mandated his application of the standard as practiced 
by doctors "in this locality," thus applying a form 
of the strict locality rule. Tr. day 3 at 111. The 
suggestion that Utah Law held doctors to the standard 
of care of physicians in good standing in the same 
or similar locality was specifically rejected. Tr. 
day 3 at 111. Plaintiff's arguments that changed 
practices and circumstances dictated the adoption of 
a national standard of care, especially in cases 
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involving defendants holding themselves out as 
specialists, were also rejected. Tr. day 3 at 114; 
4 at 10. 
It is true that, at first reading, some of the 
cases in which this court has referred to the medical 
standard of care could lead the reader to conclude 
thatastrict locality test is required. However, 
a closer analysis of the decisions containing re-
ferences to the subject shows that, in fact, the 
language of a variety of different tests appears: 
Two cases describe the standard of care to be 
the exercise of that degree of skill and care required 
of an ordinarily skilled doctor t II in the COffiffiUnity 
which he serves." Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 
266, 139 P.2d 216, 218 (1943); Fredrickson v. Maw, 
119 Utah 385, 387, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (1951). This 
language clearly reflects the strict locality rule. 
At least six cases say that a doctor must 
exercise that degree of skill and care practiced by 
skilled professionals doing "the same type of work 
in the vicinity" or "in the same area. 11 Baxter v. S~1 
78 Utah 217, 232, 2 P.2d 257, 263 (1931); Edwards v. 
Clark, 96 Utah 121, 138, -83 P.2d 1021, 1029-30 (1938), 
rehrg den., 96 Utah 140, 84 P.2d 768 (1938); ~rre~ 
v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 612, 26l_P.2d 178, 179 (1953); 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 44, 347 P.2d UOS, 
1110 (1959); Paull v. Zions First National Bank, 
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18 Utah 2d 183, 185, 417 P.2d 759, 761 (1966); 
Posnien v. Rogers, 533 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1975). 
This language, only slightly broader than the strict 
locality rule, seems to state the same general 
neighborhood rule. 
Two cases contain language which describes the 
standard to be that required of "men of similar 
calling under similar circumstances," Dickinson v. 
Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 386, 423 P.2d 663, 665 (1967); 
or "in the same or a similar locality." Baker v. 
Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 212, 79 P.2d 77, 84 (1938). This 
language further broadens the test to include the 
standards of similar localities. 
The only case to address the question of whether 
a national standard should be applied in Utah was Coon 
v. Shields, 88 Utah 75, 39 P.2d 348 (1934). At 
the time, the Court did not feel the medical pro-
fession was ready for the broader standard, but pre-
dicted the day of its eventual adoption. ~· at 
82, 39 P.2d at 350. See also Point V, infra at 47. 
Recently in Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295 
(Utah 1976), the Court spoke of the standard of care 
as being that which is "extant in medical circles." 
Ficklin, at 1297. Such language may reflect current 
judicial approaches to make the standard fit changed 
medical circumstances, in accordance with earlier predictions. 
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In order to account for the apparent lack of 
uniformity in language used by this Court in stati~ 
the medical standard of care, one need only consult 
the factual settings of the aforementioned cases. 
In no instance is the statement of the rule a 
critical element of the decision rendered in the case. 
Since no decision ever turned on which test was to 
be applied, it is natural that some imprecision could 
result. 
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931); 
and Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d l108 
(1959) involved situations where the plaintiffs failed 
to offer expert testimony on the medical standard of 
care. Since expert testimony is generally required 
to establish medical standards of care, and since 
no experts testified on any of the possible applicable 
standards, it was immaterial which standard the court 
applied. Plaintiffs would have lost in any event. 
Thus, the Court's statements that defendants were 
held to a "same vicinity" rule were dicta and not 
holdings. 
Additional explanation of the lack of consistency 
in the language on the medical standard of care to 
be applied appears in the cases where plaintiff's own 
witness, called to establish the standard of care, 
testified that defendants complied with it. such 
-16-
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was the case in Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 
P.2d 1021 (1938); and Posnien v. Rogers, 553 P.2d 
120 (Utah 1975). Since plaintiffs' own witnesses 
established the standard of care, the correctness 
of that standard obviously was not at issue in their 
respective appeals. The court's inclusion of "same 
vicinity" language in Edwards, and "same area" 
language in Posnien was not a part of the holding 
of either case. 
In two of the cases, the competency of the 
plaintiffs' experts to testify on the applicable 
standard of care apparently was not challenged at 
trial, and thus did not come into question on 
appeal. In both Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 
79 P.2d, 77 (1938), where the court spoke of a 
"similar locality" test, and Forrest v. Eason, 
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953), where· the court 
described· a "same vicinity" test, the expert witness 
testimony offered by plaintiffs on the standard of 
I 
L 
care was allowed at the trial level. In Baker, 
where the plaintiff prevailed, the defendant did not 
challenge the correctness of the standard as applied 
and is was not treated as an issue in the case on 
appeal. In Forrest, where the defendant prevailed, 
the correctness of the standard of care as established 
by Plaintiff's own witness was obviously not addressed 
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on appeal. The tests announced in both cases were, 
therefore, unnecessary to the holdings of the cases, 
and, as stated, served only an illustrative role 
in the written decisions. 
In still another group of cases, the facts 
were such that either the standard of care and the 
breach thereof were stated to be adequately established 
by the evidence, or, for the purposes of the appeal, 
were assumed to have been established. Whether the 
correct standard was applied or not was irrelevant 
to the outcome of the case since it obviously was 
decided on other grounds. In Paull v. Zions First 
National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966); 
Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 663 (1967); 
and Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 388, 423 P.2d 663 11961), 
the court assumed a breach of the standard of care, 
• but said that said breach was not proven to be the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's disability. Whichever 
standard was applied was therefore not outcome 
determinative and cannot be relied upon as the rule 
of the case:. 
Similar logic applies in the analysis of 
Fredrickon v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951) 
wherein the court held that defendant's conduct was 
violative of the strict locality rule as a matter of 
common knowledge. (Defendant sutured a surgical 
sponge in the wound created by a tonsillectomy.) 
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Obviously if defendant's conduct violated this 
narrowest of standards, it would also have violated 
any one of the broader standards. The standard 
announced by the court here, as in the cases cited 
above, was not part of the holding of the case. 
It is interesting to note that in Coon v. Shields, 
88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 (1934), probably the only 
case in which the court was directly presented 
with the opportunity to decide whether to apply the 
strict locality rule, or the similar locality rule, it 
chose to adopt neither, stating as its reason the following: 
[W]hether we adopt the rule of limitation to 
a particular community or a rule of limitation 
to similar communities, it would not affect 
this case ..•. Coon, at 83, 39 P.2d at 351. 
When the trial court in the instant case applied 
a form of the strict locality rule on the presumption 
that such a position was mandated by the decisions 
of the Supreme Court, it committed an error which 
prejudiced the rights of the plaintiff Jeannette U. 
Swan. As has been shown, although this Court has 
included in its opinions several statements relating 
to the standard of care applicable in medical mal-
practice cases, it has never, by way of holding, 
adopted any one of the four basic standards to 
which it has at various times referred. In this 
serise, the issues arising in the instant appeal 
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present a case of first impression to the Court. 
Those issues are: ( 1) What standard of care should 
be applied to the medical profession in Utah?. and 
(2) Whether an otherwise qualified expert who 
lacks only personal experience and contact with 
Utah Physicians should be precludeQ from testifying 
on the said standard of care. 
POINT II 
THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE IS AN ANACHRONISM 
WHICH HAS OUTLIVED ITS PURPOSE AND USEFULNESS 
IN EVEN THE VERY FEW JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH 
ITS OPPRESSIVE EFFECTS ARE STILL FELT. 
As described above, the strict locality rule 
states basically that a medical practitioner has the 
obligation to his patient to possess and employ only 
such reasonable skill and care as is conunonly had 
and exercised by other medical practioners in the 
particular locality or conununi ty in which he practices. 
Annot. 37 A.L.R.3d 420, 426 (1971); 40 Fordham L. 
Rev. 435, 438 (1971). This particular rule was 
developed late in the 1800s for the purpose of pro-
tecting the rural and small town practitioner who 
was presumed (perhaps with good reason), to be less 
adequately trained and informed than his big city 
brother. waitz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the 
Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 
DePaul L. Rev. 408, 410 (1969). One court, quoting 
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from an early author, supplied the following explana-
tion for the adoption of such a standard: 
There are many neighborhoods, in the west 
especially, where medical aid is of diffi-
cult attainment. Yet cases of disease and 
surgery are constantly occurring, and they 
must of necessity fall into the hands of 
those who have given the subject but little 
if any thought. * * * In such cases no more 
can be expected of the operator than the 
exercise of his best skill and judgment. 
Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46, 63 (1870). 
Under the conditions of geographic isolation 
that prevailed in the frontier days, when distances 
were great and the mode of travel was in keeping with 
muddy lanes, swollen streams and impassable mountains, 
it was natural for the standards of practice between 
locality to be markedly different. Opportunities 
for observation, experience and consultation were 
strictly limited; and the fact that news of medical 
developments appeared only in the pages of the. few 
scattered medical journals or in an occasional 
handwritten letter made it logical that the village 
doctor, making his rounds to the homes of his 
patients and fighting to provide them with what 
care and attention he could, would be judged by a 
different standard. Comment, 16 St. Louis U.L.J. 
497, 505 (1972); Ellin, The Law of Medical Malpractice 
in Maryland: A Plaintiff's Dilemma, 3 Balt. L. Rev. 
207, 212 (1974); 14 Stan L. Rev. 884, 886 (1962). 
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The conditions under which such doctors labor~ 
made it impossible for them to be attuned to the 
developments in their profession and the practices 
of their colleagues. One author provides the 
following insights into those early days: 
The general practitioner "who rode 
west . . . slept on the ground when he 
could to avoid flea-infested cabins and 
inns, where a dozen men were customarily 
lodged in a room with three or four in 
each bed. He crunched through winter 
forests on snowshoes, forded swollen rivers 
on his horse in the spring, and rode 
sweating down the hot trails of summer. Often 
the only drugstore in hundreds of miles was 
in his saddlebag. He pounded his own drugs, 
made tinctures and infusions, and put up 
prescriptions with the aid of horn balances 
and a china mortar." G. Marks & w. Beatty, 
The Story of Medicine in America 144 (1973). 
Despite possible historical and circumstantial 
justifications for the formulation of the strict 
locality rule, it is interesting to note that it was 
never adopted in England (Waltz, 18 DePaul L. Rev., 
~at 410), and was only adopted in a small 
minority of American jurisdictions. 41 Arn.Jur. 
Physicians and Surgeons §87 (1942). The reason for 
this becomes apparent as one begins to examine and 
evaluate some of its drawbacks. 
One problem that is encountered upon application 
of the strict locality rule is its tendency to make 
possible the creation of an insulated pocket of 
incompetent medical practice in a given locality. 
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Because the rule, as formulated, allowed application 
only of the standard extant in a defendant's 
corrununity, it literally demanded that a medical 
expert testifying for the plaintiff be personally 
familiar with the practice there. Waltz, 18 DePaul 
~., supra at 410. If plaintiff's expert did 
not come form defendant's home town, he arguably did 
not have the proper experience to testify against 
the defendant. 
The effective result of the strict locality rule 
was to immunize from malpractice liability .any doctor-
who happened to be the sole practitioner in his 
community. As stated by one author, under a technical 
application of such a rule, a doctor could get away 
with "treating bone fractures by the application of 
wet grape leaves and yet remain beyond the criticism 
of more enlightened practitioners from other 
communities." Id. at 411. Similarly a group of 
incompetents could set up practice in a community 
and, by uniformly practicing a substandard form of 
medicine, insulate themselves from any form of 
malpractice liability. 
Another problem that is encountered in applying 
the strict locality rule sterns from the natural 
reluctance of physicians who work together and whose 
paths cross, to testify against one another. It is 
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true that the American Medical Association, inter-
preting its Principles of Medical Ethics, states 
that a "physician should expose, without fear or 
favor, incompetent or corrupt, dishonest or unethical 
conduct on the part of members of the profession . 
American Medical Association, Opinions and Reports 
of the Judicial Council 15 (1966). However, the 
difficulties experienced by plaintiffs in finding 
doctors willing to testify in their behalf have been 
recognized by courts, legislatures, and commentators 
alike. Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 
P.2d 829 (1968); Steiginga v. Thran, 30 N.J. Super. 
423, 105 A.2d 10 (App.Div. 1954); Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford University, 154Cal.App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 
(1957); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 431 
P.2d 973 (1967); Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 
94 N.W. 607 (1903); Mass. Ann. Laws. ch. 233, §79C 
(1974); Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The 
Silent Medical Treatment, 1 Vill. L. Rev. 250 (1956); 
Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. ReY.;_ 
520 (1965). 
Even in cases where the physician's wrongdoing 
is most egregious there -is a decided unwillingness of 
doctors to take the stand for the plaintiff-patient. 
Dean William Prosser cites a su£vey made by the 
Boston University Law-Medicine Research Institute, 
as reported in Medical Economics, August 28, 19 61 • 
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in which the reality of physician reluctance to 
testify is most forcefully illustrated. 
[O]ut of 214 doctors, only 31% of the 
specialists and 27% of the general practi-
tioners said they would be willing to 
appear for the plaintiff if a surgeon, 
operating on a diseased kidney, removed 
the wrong one. W. Prosser, Handbook of 
the Law of Torts 227, n.3 (4th Ed. 1971). 
Though such a reluctance on the part of doctors 
to take the stand on behalf of a victim of mal-
practice may seem improper, it is not difficult to 
understand. Many doctors naturally hesitate to 
injure friends and fellow-craftsmen. Some fear 
the foreign atmosphere of the: courtroom and the 
rigors of undergoing cross-examination. Still 
others are reluctant to suffer the loss of time 
and income frc.m practice that may be involved in 
a courtroom appearance. U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Report of the Secretary's 
Commission on Medical Malpractice 36-37 (1973). One 
case reported that an insurance company cancelled 
the professional liability policy of a doctor who 
had the temerity to testify against a fellow 
practitioner being sued for malpractice. The 
defendant was insured by the same company. L'Orange 
v. Medical Protective co. 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968). 
Though this case is not r.ecessarily indicative of 
the actions of aJl malpractice insurers, it cannot 
be gainsaid that many pressures are exerted on the 
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physician to discourage his cooperation with 
plaintiffs in malpractice cases. It would be un-
realistic to suppose that a plaintiff would be 
able to produce the necessary expert witnesses to 
establish his case under a strict locality rule. 
Defendants, on the other hand are able to 
obtain whatever local experts they may need at the 
trial of a malpractice case. Evidence of this 
fact is found in the recent case of Capobianco v. 
Gordon, 19 Md.App. 662, 313 A.2d 517 (1974). There 
the gratuitous services of a panel of experts from 
a Medical-Chirurgical Faculty were offered to a 
defendant physician to help in the defense of his 
case. A letter written to the defendant by counsel 
for the Med-Chi Faculty contained the following: 
Dear Dr. Gordon: 
I confirm the referral by Med-Chi to 
this office of your defense pursuant to its 
By Laws. 
I should appreciate your insurance 
carrier and its counsel advising me of such 
time, if any, as it would consider a panel 
of doctors to be of assistance in this matter. 
In the meantime, you are cautioned to 
restrict communication on the subject to 
authorized representatives of your carrier, 
counsel and this office. 
Very truly yours, 
/s/ John F. King 
JOHN F. KING 
its 
Capobianco, at 664, 313 A.2d at 518. (Emphasis added.) 
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The foreclosure to plaintiff of all opportunity 
to meet such determined opposition by disallowing 
the production of an expert from a more disinterested 
medical area is inimical to the cause of justice. 
Probably the biggest problem with the strict 
locality rule is that it is blind to the realities 
of modern medical science. While it may have served 
a valid purpose in frontier times, it has no place 
in jurisprudence today. As observed by one court: 
[T)imes have changed. Modern means of 
transportation permit country doctors to 
attend up-to-date medical seminars; the 
general circulation of medical journals 
makes new developments readily available 
to them, and they can easily and quickly 
communicate with the most modern and up-
to-date medical centers in cities throughout 
the United States * * * [T]oday's rural 
practitioner can and does give and receive 
advice transmitted thousands of miles over 
the telephone, and he is expected to keep 
himself apprised of recent developments as 
they are regularly published in medical 
journals. Douglas v. Bussabarger 73 Wash.2d 
476, 438 p.2d 829, 837 (1968). 
No longer does the medical community consist of 
a patchwork of isolated practitioners whose particular 
brand of medicine requires legal protection from 
comparison to the standards adhered to in other 
areas of the United States. "Surely there could 
be found today few physicians who would defend the 
notion that their brothers in some parts of the 
country are, or should be pe~mitted ~Q be, Jess 
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competent than those in other regions, based not 
on impermissibly variant education and training 
but on some inexplicable depressing force of 
geography alone." Waltz, 18 DePaul L. Rev., 
supra at 420. The courts have recognized the 
realities of today's medical environment and have 
considered the inequities produced by the strict 
locality rule and, with few exceptions, have abandoned 
it. Thus, they have acknowledged that "the legal 
rule ceases when the reasons for it cease." D. 
Louisell and H. Williams, 1 Medical Malpractice 
,[8.06 (1973). (See Point V, infra at 42, for 
a discussion of the nationally uniform standards of 
medical practice.} 
In the present case the trial judge quoted from 
a Nevada case, Lockart v. MacLean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 
P.2d 670 (1961), to support his decision to reject 
testimony by Dr. Rocovich on the standard of care 
to be applied. Tr. day 4 at 7. The circumstances 
of that case make is inapposite to the matters at 
issue here. Lockart involved a malpractice suit 
brought against a Reno doctor and hospital by a 
plaintiff who developed a bone infection subsequent 
to surgery. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that 
defendants "'did not exercise the degree of care' 
. . . d by hospitals 
skill and learning ordinarily possesse 
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and physicians and surgeons practicing in the same 
locality.'" Lockart, at 671. (Emphasis added.) 
As his expert witness, plaintiff offered an 
osteopath from California who based his testimony on 
"his knowledge of the standard of conduct of surgeons 
and orthopedic surgeons practicing throughout the 
united States." Lockart, at 673. The expert was 
held to be incompetent to testify. 
As can be seen, the trial court in Lockart was 
forced by the pleadings to apply the strict locality 
rule. Plaintiff in effect elected the standard by 
which his expert's competence was to be judged. 
Under that standard his expert failed to qualify. 
The present case contains no such procedural 
justification for the preservation of the jurispru-
dential relic known as the strict locality rule. 
POINT III 
THE SAME GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD RULE IS A 
RESTATEMENT OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE 
CONTAINING THE SAME DEFECTS AND CREATING 
THE SAME PROBLEMS AS ITS PREDECESSOR. 
In recognition of the near insuperable handicap 
which had been imposed on the victims of malpractice who, 
under the strict locality rule, were required to produce 
local expert witnesses where none were to be found, the 
courts in many jurisdictions attempted to modify the 
rule. One such modification was the formulation of 
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the "same general neighborhood" rule which, by 
holdj_ng a doctor to practice medicine in accordance 
with the standards of physicians in good standing in 
his same general area, allowed a malpractice plaintiff 
to produce experts that were not from the defendant's 
hometown, though they were from places nearby. Thus, 
in Willard v. Norcross, 86 Vt. 426, 85 A. 904 (1913), 
plaintiff was allowed to introduce expert testimony 
of doctors that practiced 40 miles away from the town 
where the defendant practiced. Also in Geraty v. 
Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932), plaintiff's 
I 
I 
I 
I 
exp_ert from Bridgport, Connecticut, was allowed to testify 
on the standard of care in defendant's hometown of New 
London, Connecticut. 
With the transportion and communication advances 
of later years, some courts, applying the same general 
neighborhood rule, expanded the boundaries of the 
"neighborhood" slightly to include larger land areas. 
See_ Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1970). 
However, by preserving the geographical insularity of 
a particular area, the same general neighborhood rule 
perpetuates many of the same problems as existed under 
the strict locality rule. In effect, it is merely a 
new name for the strict locality rule, the only difference 
being a moderate enlargement of the locality. 
Of any rule which Implicit in a court's adoption 
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requires conformance to standards of care of only a 
given geographical neighborhood is the idea that the 
standards of care in that area should be permitted to 
be different from other areas. Also implicit in the 
establishment of a geographical neighborhood is the 
idea that the standards within that neighborhood are 
or should be uniform. Thus, if the State of Utah were 
to be set apart as being a "general neighborhood" it 
would be on the implicit assumption that the standards 
of care for physicians in the state were uniform, but 
that those standards, as compared with physicians of 
other states, were different, i.e. higher or lower. 
If the standards of care in other states were lower 
than in Utah, a rule precluding the testimony of out-
of-state experts on the standards familiar to them would 
be unnecessary. Utah doctors would be practicing at a 
higher level. If the standards of care in other states 
were higher than Utah's the courts, by excluding expert 
testimony from out-of-state witnesses, would foster 
and perpetuate medical inferiority on a statewide basis. 
This court cannot, without believing that Utah standards 
are justifiably lower than those of other states, counten-
ance the appli.cation of a same general neighborhood rule 
in such a way as to affirm the lower court's decision to 
reject testimony from Dr. Rocovich. 
The same general neighborhood rule likewise fails 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to cure the problems created by physician reluctaoce 
to testify for a plaintiff in a malpractice case. 
The mobility enjoyed by today's doctor has resulted 
in his knowing or being known by a large number of his 
fellow practitioners from all over the state. Close 
collegial relationships develop as doctors attend the 
same seminars, conferences and symposia, belong to 
the same organizations, refer patients to each other 
and rely on each other for consultation and advice. 
The climate that develops operates to discourage a 
doctor from testifying against someone he has met or might 
meet. The vitality of a rule must be questioned when it 
can prevent a patient with a legitimate claim from 
reaching a jury with his cause because, when he could 
not find a "neighborhood" physician to testify in his 
behalf, he obtained help from out-of-state. 
As with the strict locality rule,· the same gerieral 
neighborhood rules ignore the realities of contemporary 
medical practice. Standards of medical care in Utah are 
as high as those in California and the rest of the nation. 
Were it otherwise, patients would elect to receive all 
but emergency treatment outside of the state. The 
treatment of Mrs. Swan was not an emergency. Tr. day 2 at 
elogratl 
16. Also Dr. Rocovich was prepared to testify that my 
· pro-
and decompression laminectomies were not esoteric 
. logists, 
cedures, but were performed routinely by neuro 
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orthopedists and neurosurgeons. Tr. day 3 at 119. 
The standard of care for their performance was well 
established throughout the country, and was the 
same. Id. 
Utah doctors already enjoy a degree of legal 
protection not afforded other citizen tortfeasors. With 
the passage of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
they have the protection of a shorter statute of limit-
ations, insulation against liability for breach of 
implied contract and warranty, entitlement to the ser-
vice of an advance notice of intent of any plaintif~ 
to commence an action against them for malpractice, plus 
special buffers against liability for failure to obtain 
a patient's informed consent to treatment. See Utah 
Code Annotated, §§78-14-4, 78-14-6, 78-14-8, 78-14-5, 
(Supp. 1976). When the Washington Supreme Court observed 
the preferred status granted to the medical profession 
in that state, it refused to affirm the trial court's 
application of even the broader "similar community" 
rule opting instead for the "general professional" or 
national standard, Douglas v. Bussabarger 73 Wash.2d 
476, 438 P.2d, 829, 838 (1968). It said, 
If we were to affirm the judgment of the 
trial court, not only would we perpetuate the 
advantageous position of the medical profession, 
but we would exaggerate and extend it unnecessarily. 
Douglas, at 831. 
Aff irmance of the trial court decision in the present 
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case would necessitate adoption by this court of a form 
of outmoded and unjust strict locality rule. The facts 
of contemporary medical practice demand the adoption 
of a rule more reflective of reality. 
POINT IV 
THE SIMILAR LOCALITY RULE OFFERS AN ENLIGHTENED 
APPROACH TO THE STANDARD OF CARE TO BE APPLIED 
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES WHICH, IF APPLIED 
IN THIS CASE, WOULD HAVE ALLOWED PLA!NTIFF'S 
EXPERT TO TESTIFY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE. 
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States 
have modified the harsh effects of the strict locality 
and same general neighborhood rules by adopting a test 
which holds a defendant practitioner to the standard of 
skill and care ordinarily observed by other physicians 
in good standing in the defendant's same or a similar 
locality. Annot. 37 A.L.R.3d. 420, 426 (1971); King 
& Coe, The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 ~ 
L. Rev. 221, 222 (1974). 
At first, some courts elected to interpret "similar 
locality" to mean similar in terms of socioeconomic and 
geographic factors, e.g. size of population, type of 
economy, geographic proximity, etc. See Michael V...:.. 
Roberts, 91 N.D. 499, 23-A.2d 361 (1941); Morrill~ 
Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d, 620 (1950); ~!!! 
v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924 (1902). More recentlY • 
1 the "similar however, courts which continue to app Y 
-34-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
locality rule" have tended to reject a purely 
socioeconomic or geographic approach and have 
instead looked toward the similarity or "medical 
factors" such as medical schools, teaching hospitals 
and research and laboratory facilities in the localities 
to be compared. See Cook v. Lichtblau,144 So.2d 312 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 
Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Cavallero v. Sharp, 
84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956); Teig v. St. John's 
Hospital, 63 Wash.2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963). See also 
40 Fordham L. Rev. 435, 439 (1971); 14 Stan. L. Rev. 
884, 890 (1962). 
One commentator described as follows the conditions 
under which an expert could be qualified to testify in 
a malpractice case applying the similar locality rule: 
The modern view of a majority of courts 
is that a medical expert is free to testify in 
a malpractice case if his community or other 
communities with which he is familiar bear 
sufficient similarity to that of the defendant. 
And in determining similarity the courts will 
not now look to such socio-economic facts as 
population, type of economy, and income level 
but to factors more directly relating to the 
practice of medicine. In the main, an expert 
practicing in a locality hewing medical 
facilities comparable to those existing in the 
defendant's community is permitted to testify 
concerning the standard of care governing the 
defendant. The number and quality of hospitals, 
laboratories and medical schools are typical 
considerations. Of course, the nature of the 
community in which the witness currently 
practices is irrelev2.nt if he happens also to 
possess familiarity with standards in the 
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defendant's locale or in areas sufficiently 
similar to it. Waltz. 18 DePaul L. Rev. 
supra at 415. 
In Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Utah law, 
affirmed the decision of the trial court to admit the ex-
pert testimony of a San Francisco general practitioner 
called by plaintiff to establjsh the medical standard of 
care for treating bone fractures in Kanab, Utah. Of interest 
in the Riley case is the fact that the foundation laid for 
said expert's testimony dealt not with geography or popula-
tion but with similarities in medical practice. The evidence 
was that plaintiff's expert had operated a 20-bed hospital 
in a small Texas town, had set and casted between 120 and 
150 fractures similar to the ones in question and, "through 
his experience, reading, lectures and travels, was familiar 
with the practice in small towns throughout the United 
States •.•. " Riley, at 57. (Emphasis added.) Further-
more, it was established that the standard of care for 
general practitioners was approximately the same in Kanab 
as in Salt Lake City and San Francisco. Since the communities 
with which plaintiff's expert was familiar were similar 
as to treatment of fractures, he was deemed to have been 
properly qualified to testify. 
In Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.Zd 
440 (1973), the trial court refused to allow a 
California pathologist to testify as to whether the 
defendant North Carolina doctor's 
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was in accord with accepted medical practice on the 
grounds that said pathologist was not actually acquainted 
with medical practices in the North Carolina community 
where defendant ?racticed. On appeal the trial court 
was held to have erred in its ruling. The court said 
that such testimony from the California pathologist should 
have been admitted since he was familiar with the standard 
of professional competence and care customary in 
conununities similar to defendant's among physicians 
engaged in his field of practice. 
Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 
(1967) also addressed the question of the competency of 
out-of-state expert witnesses to testify on the medical 
standard of care in a jurisdiction using the similar 
locality approach. In Hundley, plajntiff introduced 
deposition testimony frc•m a New York opthalmologist 
on the standard of care in a community similar to Charles-
ton, West Virginia. After noting that the reasons for 
the former strict application of the locality rule had 
largely disappeared, the court observed that although the 
witness did not testify that he was personally familiar 
with the standard of care for performance of cataract 
operations in Charleston, west Virginia, he nevertheless 
did testify that he was fimiliar with the standard of 
care observed in such operations throughout the entire 
country. The court said that such testimony was sufficient 
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to show his familiarity with the standard of care in Charle;. 
ton,because if the witness was familiar with the sta~a~ 
procedure for performing cataract operations throughout the 
entire country, his familiarity with such standard procedur' 
therefore embraced Charleston, West Virginia. The court 
stated that it was rejecting a strict application of the 
locality rule and was holding instead that since the witness 
was sufficiently familiar with the standard of medical 
practice in areas similar to Charleston, he was therefore 
sufficiently familiar with the standard of Charleston to be 
competent to testify in the case. 
Should the court conclude that the proper rule to 
apply in Utah with respect. to the medical standard of care, 
is the similar locality rule, logic, reason and reality 
dictate that the correct measure of an area's similarity 
is not geographic proximity or demographic composition, but 
the similarity of medical factors such as the presence of or 
access to medical schools, hospitals, laboratories, research 
facilities, equipment, speciality assistance, libraries, 
reference materials and publications. 
Under such a test Dr. Rocovich was properly qualified 
1 . d pJa1: tc- give testimony on the standard of care to be app ie · 
and Salt Lake CitY tiff offered to prove that the Los Angeles 
medical communities were similar. Tr. day 4 at 15. 
The court, 
however, rejected the offer. Id. at 16. Testimony that was ir:: 
es tablished Lhal l duced either directly or by way of proffer 
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like Los Ange] es, Salt Lake City, through facilities at 
the university of Utah, was a regional medical center 
serving a large geographic segment of the western United 
states. Tr. day 4 at 15. The Orthopedic Hospital of 
Los Angeles with which plaintiff's expert is associated, 
is affiliated with an accredited medical school and provides 
a complete training program for interns, while both it and 
the Queen of Angeles Hospital provide a complete training 
program for residents. Tr. day 3 at 104; American Hospital 
Association, The AHA Guide to the Health Care Field 32 
(1972). Hospitals in Salt Lake City have similar affiliations 
with and access to the expertise at the University of Utah 
Medical School, and offer training programs for interns 
and residents. Tr. day 3 at 107. AHA Guide, supra at 223. 
The programs in which residency training is conducted in LOS 
Angeles as well as Salt Lake City are supervised by national 
accreditation agencies which require compliance with the 
same standards of training and practice in the separate 
localities. Tr. day 4 at 13; 14 Stan. L. Rev. 884, 888, 
n.20 (1962). Plaintiff's expert testified that the Univer-
sity of Utah Medical School was "a very good one." Tr. day 
3 at 107. He said that because of the quality of the school, 
the physicians of Salt Lake City were able "to offer good 
medical care to the people of this community like all good 
medical schools should ... and do." Tr. day 3 at 107. 
Both the Queen of Angeles Hospital and the Orthopedic 
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Hospital of Los Angeles are and have been accredited 
from some time. Tr. 3 at 108. Accreditation is grant~ 
by a national organization which requires compliance 
with certain standards set for the medical staff; and 
the nursing, anesthesia, dietetic, emergency, environmental, 
medical records, nuclear medicine, pathology, pharmaceutical 
and library services, to name a few. See Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for 
Hospitals (1970). 
Each year the American Hospital Association publishes 
a list of U.S. Hospitals in which it itemizes the nature 
of facilities contained tberein and approvals granted 
thereto. In 1972, the list showed important medical similar· 
ities between the Queen of Angels and the Orthopedic Hospitali 
of Los Angeles, where Dr. Rocovich practices, and the St. 
Mark's Hospital of Salt Lake where Dr. Thoen and Dr· Lamb 
practice. Common to the said Los Angeles Hospitals and 
the St. Mark's Hospital were the following facilities: 
postoperative recovery room, intensive care unit, pharmacy 
. with FT registered pharmacist, histophathology laboratory, 
blood bank, electroencephalagraphy capabilities, inhalation 
therapy departments, physical therapy departments, emergency 
d · units, 
departments, social work departments, intensive car iac 
rt· 
psychiatric emergency services, organized outpatient depa 
tments. 
h · l · 1 · · d vol_u_ nteer services depar ments, ospita auxi iaries an 
· · The AHA Gui· de to the He~ American Hospital Association, ~-
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care Field 32, 223 (1972). When other Salt Lake and Los 
Angeles hospitals are compared, it can be seen that as of 
1972 both localities contained very complete hospital 
facilities according to the American Hospital Association. Id. 
There is ready access to medical literature in both 
Salt Lake City and Los Angeles. The University of Utah 
Medical School has a very complete library, and each 
accredited hospital is to provide books, periodicals and 
other materials appropriate to meet the needs of the medical 
and hospital staff. Joint Commission of Accreditation of 
Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (1970)~ Dr. 
Rocovich testified that he had ready access to the libraries 
of the Los Angeles County Medical Association, Queen of 
Angels Hospital, Orthopedic Hospital of Los Angeles, and the 
medical schools at the University of Southern California and 
the University of California at Los Angeles. Tr. day 3 at 
108-109. 
In addition to stating his professional and educational 
credentials, Dr. Rocovich testified that he had personally 
performed in excess of 1,000 myelograrns and 1,000 lumbar 
decompression laminectomies of the type performed by 
defendants upon Mrs. Swan. (Tr. day 3 at 109). Had the court 
applied the similar locality rule to the medical standard of 
care, it would have allowed Dr. Rocovich to express an 
opinion thereon and could not have granted defendants' motion 
to d · · ismiss on the grounds that it did. 
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POINT V 
IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF 
MEDICAL PRACTICE TODAY TO REQUIRE COMPLIANCE 
BY THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, ESPECIALLY ITS 
SPECIALISTS, WITH A NATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE. 
Physicians practicing as specialists in the treatment 
of some particular condition have consistently been held to 
a higher standard of care than their generalist collegues, 
Rather than be held only to the standards of practice in 
localities similar to his, the specialist is required to 
exercise that degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed 
and used by similar specialists. Annot. 21 A.L.R.3d 953 
(1968). Restatement (Second) of Torts §299A, Comment d 
(1965). In an article prepared for the American Medical 
Association Office of General Counsel the following comment 
concerning the standard of care required of specialists 
appeared: 
The specialist is increasingly presumed to 
have kept up with his field, and courts point 
out in numerous decisions that the reason a 
patient consults a specialist is in order to 
see a physician who has kept up with advances 
in medicine. Therefore, an increasing number 
of courts find it appropriate to hold specialists 
to a national standard of due care. Holder, 
Standard of Care for Specialists, 226 J.A.M.A~ 
395, 396 (1973). 
In Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 
(1972) the plaintiff, in a malpractice action against an 
Arizona specialist, called a Los Angeles neurosurgeon as 
her expert witness. At trial the court ruled plaintiff's 
State What the Standard of care was expert incompetent to 
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in the community where the defendant practiced, on the 
grounds that he had no personal experience in the state. 
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. 
We hold that, for a plaintiff to recover 
in a malpractice case involving a specialist, 
he must prove that the defendant specialist in 
his acts failed tc• meet the standard of care 
required of physicians in the same speciality 
practiced by the defendant. Krenke at 159. 
The court further held that for an expert to qualify 
to express an opinion on what that standard of care is he 
must be shown to have knowledge of and familiarity "with 
the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by 
physicians engaged in the same type of speciality as the 
defendant." Id. 
A similar result was reached in Nacarrato v. Grob, 
384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970). There the trial 
court was reversed for not allowing two specialists, one 
from Los Angeles and another from Chicago, to testify for 
the plaintiff in a malpractice case against a Detroit 
specialist. The Michigan Supreme Court said, 
The reliance of the public upon the skills 
of a specialist and the wealth and sources of 
his knowledge are not limited to the geographic 
~rea in which he practices. Rather his knowledge 
is a specialty. He specializes so that he may 
keep abreast. Any other standard for a specialist 
would negate the fundamental expectations and 
purpose of a specialty. The standard of care for 
~ specialist should be that of a resaonable special~ 
is~ practicing medicine in light of present.day 
scientific knowledge. Therefore, geographical 
conditions or circumstances control neither the 
standard of a specialist's care nor the competence 
of an expert's testimony. Nacarrato, at 791. 
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The incorporation into the law of a national su~~ 
of care for specialists is simply a recognition of that 
which the doctors themselves did long ago. The establish· 
ment and maintenance of national standards for specialists 
has long been a purpose and function of the American Board 
of Medical Specialities. Marquis--Who' s Who, 1 Directo~ 
of Medical Specialists xvii (15th ed. 1972). The Board, 
by means of comprehensive written and oral examinations 
administered on a nationwide basis to qualifying candidates, 
determines and certifies the competence of its members. !i· 
at xviii; Tr. day 2 at 2; 3 at 65-66. Such a program results, 
in the establishment of a uniform standard of care throughou: 
the United States in each specialty field. 
Both defendant physicians testified that the standard \ 
of care in their particular special ties was uniform througho·,: 
the country. During examination of defendant Dr. Lamb, the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q. Doctor, I unc1erstand you are .. · a 
certified board member of orthopedics? 
A. American Board of Orthopedic Surgery, yes. 
Q. And that board is governed by a national 
standard, is it not? 
A. Yes. . ld 
Q. And orthopedists from Salt Lake City wou , 
take the same test that orthopedists from ca1ifo~nia 
would take, would be held at the same standards; is 
that correct? _ 
A. Yes, it is a national test. . have 
Q. And the principles of orthopedic surgery 
become pre.tty well nationalized, haven't they? 
A. Yes. 
Tr. day 2 at 2. 
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Defendant Dr. Thoen said much the same thing: 
Q. Doctor, is the standard of skill and care 
for neurologists . uniform within the United 
States? 
A. The standard of care for board certified 
neurologists is supposed to be uniform throughout 
the states, yes. 
Tr. day 3 at 5. See also Tr. day 3 at 67. 
Dr. Thoen went on to agree that the standard of care required 
of non-board certified neurologists was the same as for 
certified neurologists. Tr. day 3 at 6. 
When one examines the educational backgrounds of the 
Utah specialists certified ~-n the specialty fields of o~tho-
pedic surgery and neurology as of 1972, it can be readily 
appreciated that geography is not determinative of standards 
of care. Utah orthopedic specialists, fer example, studied 
in Utah, California, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Minnesota, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Tennesse, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, 
Massachusetts, Oregon, Kansas, Indiana, New Jersey and Ohio. 
Marquis--Who' s Who, l Directory of Medical Specialists 1059 
(15th ed. 1972). Utah neurology specialists studied in Utah, 
Colorado, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, 
New York, Alaska, California, Maryland and Massachusetts. 
Id. v. 2, at 1820-21. The defendants in this case have 
studied in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa and Massachusetts in 
addition to Utah. Tr. day 2 at 1, 76; 3 at 1, 2, 75. 
The defendants in this case are both certified special-
ists who, by their own admissions, are governed by a national 
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standard of care. As was stated by one court, "A defendant 
should not be judged by a lower standard than he himself 
requests." Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash.2d 476, 433 
P.2d 829, 837 (1968). It was error for the trial court to 
have applied the rule that it did in the face of defendants' 
admissions. 
In 1934, the Utah Supreme Court was presented with the 
question of whether a general medical professional standard h 
of care should be applied in judging the conduct of a 
11 
physician charged with malpractice. Coon v. Shields, 88 
Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 (1934). The issue arose when, following i 
treatment of plaintiff's fractured leg, gangrene set in 
necessitating its amputation. Among plaintiff's allegations , 
of negligence against her doctor was the claim that he failed\ 
to clean and disinfect her leg wound. At trial, one of the 
questions propounded to plaintiff's expert was ". what 
methods according to the present standard of care and skill 
and state of medical science might be 'done' in the way of 
cleaning the wound." Coon, at 82, 39 P.2d at 350. The 
trial court ruled out the answer to this and other questions 
asked of the expert and, at the close of the evidence, dir-
ected a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. 
ruling 
In addressing the propriety of the trial court's 
Court upheld w:Lth respect to the above question, the 
h · · f · 1 standard as set by the medical t e re)ection o a nationa 
profession. However, in so holding, the court joined 
unanimously in predicting the eventual adoption of such a 
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standard in Utah: 
When we consider the modern advanced stage 
of the med~cal profession, the many facilities 
for communication and dissemination of the latest 
developments in the various sciences involved in 
the practice of that profession, we can say that 
there is some justice in contending that the 
standard of care required of a physician or 
Siirgeoilshould not be limited to any particular 
community or locality in an effort to recognize 
a natural migration of the more skilled to the 
larger centers of population. The time will 
undoubtedly come when such limitation will fall 
by the wayside. Is that time here now? We 
believe not, and cite as our reason for so 
believing the fact that in these Western States 
there are still many communities cut off from the 
advantages of easy communication with the outside 
world. Coon, at 82-83, 39 P.2d at 350. 
Developments since 1934 clearly demonstrate that-as 
predicted by the Court, the time has come for the geographical 
limitations of medical standards to "fall by the wayside." 
Advances in the fields of transportation and communication 
alone virtually assure today's physician ready access to 
current information, modern hospital facilities, and skilled 
specialists in all but the most serious emergency situations. 
Seventeen years ago Louisell and Williams wrote of the 
many aids then readily available to physicians to help them 
keep abreast of developments in their profession. Among 
the aids listed were: 
The "comprehensive coverage" of the Journal 
of the American Medic~l Association, the 
availability of numerous other journals, the 
ubiquitous "detail men" of the drug companies, 
clo~ed circuit television presentations of medical 
subJects, special radio networks for physicians, 
tape recorded digests of med~cal literature, and 
hundreds of widely available post graduate courses. 
D. Louisell & H. Williams, The Parenchyma of Law 183 
(1960). 
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The authors observed that the medical profession was, 
through such means, establishing national standards. They 
then added, "Medicine realizes this, so it is inevitable 
that the law will do likewise." Id. at 184. 
In addition to the items mentioned above, many 
other factors contribute to the establishment of nationally 
uniform standards for doctors. As a condition of licensure 
in most states, a doctor must have graduated from an 
accredited medical school which, in order to qualify for 
such accreditation, must meet rigid standards imposed by 
national organizations of the American Medical Association. 
See Medi.cal Education in the United States, 210 J.A.M.A. 
1455, 1460 (1969). Internship and residency programs~ 
hospitals likewise require special approval 
organizations, which approval is contingent 
by national I 
upon the hospital'' 
being accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of 
Hospitals, an arm of the American Hospital Association. See 
14 Stan. L. Rev. 884, 888, n.20 (1962). The role of the 
specialty boards in setting uniform standards of care has 
already been mentioned. See supra, at 44. 
The federal government is also beginning to play a 
significant role in the establishment of uniform national 
f 1 h 1 f f the money for America's standards o care. Near y a o 
t Lee, 
medical schools now comes from the federal governmen · 
Health A~~ Medical Education--A Brief History, Medical and ~ 
29 (Encyc, Brit. 1977). With the d federal 1 recently enacte 
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statute creating Professional Standards Review Organiza-
tions, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is 
empowered, under certain circumstances, to establish uniform 
standards of care. 42 U.S.C.A. §1320c-l et. seq. (1974). 
The standards required of health care providers qualified 
to administer trea trnent under the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs are also detailed, exacting and nationally consis-
tent. 42 U. S .C .A. §1395 et. seq. (1974), and applicable 
regulations. 
As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts when it struck down the locality rule in its juris-
diction, "The time has come when the medical profession 
should no longer be Balkanized by the application of varying 
geographic standards in malpr.o.ctice cases." Bruce v. 
Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in excluding testimony from Dr. 
Peter Rocovich on the medical standard of care for defendants' 
performance of a myelogram and a lumbar decompression 
laminectomy upon Mrs. Jeannette Swan. In excluding said 
testimony the court applied a version of the anachronistic 
strict locality rule which-is not and should not be the law 
in Utah. 
The non-geographically based similar locality rule 
and the national standard of the profession rule are those 
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which most accurately reflect conditions in contemporary 
medical practice. The latter rule is especially appropriate 
in this case because both defendants held themselves out 
as specialists in their profession. 
Plaintiff's expert was properly qualified to 
testify on the applicable standards of medical care 
under either the similar locality or national standard 
rules. For this reason plaintiff should have been 
permitted to reach the jury with her claims of defendants' 
negligence. The judgment of the lower court must be 
reversed and a new trial ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this .id.._ day of May, 1977. 
HANSEN & ORTON 
HANSEN 
Attorney or Plaintiff/Appellant 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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